THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL VALUES AND STATUS IN SYSTEMS OF
REPUTATION MANAGEMENT

by

Eric Gladstone

Bachelor of Arts
Grand Valley State University, 2006

_____

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Master of Arts in

Sociology

College of Arts and Sciences

University of South Carolina

2009

Accepted by:

Brent Simpson, Director of Thesis

Barry Markovsky, Reader

David Willer, Reader

James Buggy, Dean of The Graduate School

UMI Number: 1467350

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI®

ABSTRACT

Current research on altruism and prosocial behavior is based on systems of reputation management. A number of studies show that those with prosocial reputations are rewarded with increased exchange opportunities; thus people act in ways to bolster their reputations. This research extends prior thinking on reputation management systems by addressing how social values (stable preferences for how outcomes are distributed between self and others) and social status (social standing relative to other individuals) interact to systems of reputation management. Specifically, I test impression management theory and competitive altruism theory which make competing predictions. Impression management theory states that because actors view high status others as the source of social and material rewards, participants will be more motivated to reputation manage (as measured by giving in a dictator game) when observed by higher status others. Competitive altruism theory states that as one's relative status increases so too does one's concern for reputation management. I show that both theories fail to accurately predict the observed behavior, and that social values moderate experiences of status within systems of reputation management.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Systems of reputation management form the theoretical backbone of current research on altruism and prosocial behavior. Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and costly signaling theories each underscores the importance of reputation for producing and maintaining cooperative behavior among primarily self-interested actors. Indirect reciprocity occurs when individuals help others in order to develop or maintain a favorable reputation and so be included in future social interactions (Panchanathan and Boyd 2004). Work in this area has demonstrated that altruistic and cooperative behaviors are evolutionarily stable strategies. Additional work on image scoring, a process where actors assign rank orderings to cooperators and non-cooperators, has shown that reputation systems can help avoid problems associated with the tragedy of commons (Nowak and Sigmund 1998). And research on costly signaling, a process where actors engage in costly behavior to broadcast favorable qualities such as skill and leadership abilities, has provided evidence that behaviors which may appear to be irrational are often motivated by concerns for status enhancement (Smith et al, 1998).

Building on prior research, I argue that reputation systems are embedded within social structures, and interact with important social forces. Specifically, in the current work I argue that concern for reputation management is influenced by status hierarchies. That status is a powerful social force is well documented in sociological research.

1

Humans are prone to forming status hierarchies (Adler 1930; Bales 1950; 1951). Unless actively suppressed by group members, status hierarchies emerge in virtually all human groups such as athletic teams, community associations, and church organizations. Previous research demonstrates that positions in status hierarchies affect both physical (e.g., longevity and cortisone levels) and mental factors, such as social cognition and emotional stability (Barkow 1975; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989; Keltner et al, 1998). Indeed, humans appear hardwired to perceive and react to social hierarchies (Zink et al, 2008). Thus, status hierarchies are a ubiquitous component of human social life with important consequences.

I outline two competing perspectives on how status hierarchies affect generosity within reputation management systems. The first perspective is grounded in impression management theory and predicts that generosity will decrease when one's relative status is high whereas generosity will increase when one's relative status is low. An alternative prediction falls out of competitive altruism theory: this hypothesis states that as one's relative status increases so too does one's level of generosity. I reconcile these two competing perspectives by proposing a *person* x *situation* explanation that accounts for heterogeneity of social preferences. Specifically, I demonstrate that stable social preferences, known as social value orientations, moderate the interaction of status and reputation on generosity. My research uses a two person dictator game with an observer. The dictator game is composed of two positions or roles, dictator and receiver. The dictator is given a money endowment and determines an allocation (split) of the endowment. The receiver gets the remainder of the endowment not allocated by the proposer to him/her self. I modify this design slightly by introducing a third party who

2

can observe the behavior of the dictator (see, for example, Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). Further, I introduce a status hierarchy by manipulating the dictator's status vis-à-vis the observer. (The dictator and receiver are always equal in status.) I assess how concern for reputation management, as measured by level of giving in the dictator game, depends on the dictator's status relative to the third party observer.

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. I first outline impression management theory, which predicts that the dictator's status (relative to the observer) has a negative impact on generosity. I then show that competitive altruism theory predicts a positive relationship between relative status and generosity. Thereafter, I reconcile these two competing perspectives by outlining a *person* x *situation* argument. I then discuss the experimental design and procedure, results, and conclude with a discussion and suggestions for future work.

3

CHAPTER II

IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT THEORY

Impression management is a goal directed process whereby individuals attempt to control others' impressions. Prior work has identified three primary reasons that individuals impression manage: to maximize cost-benefit ratios (Schlenker 1980), to enhance self-esteem (Adler 1930; Allport 1955; Rogers 1959; Rosenberg 1979), and to develop desired social identities (Goffman 1959; Rosenberg 1979; Jones and Wortman 1982). In addition to understanding the goals of impression management, researchers have also demonstrated that situational factors affect the actor's motivations to impression manage. Below I discuss how the value of the intended impression target can affect one's motivation to impression manage[1] as well as some common impression management tactics.

Target Value

Of particular importance in determining if and when a person engages in impression management is the value of the target. By virtue of personal characteristics or attributes, certain intended targets prompt one to impression manage more than others. Holding all other factors constant, people are more likely to impression manage when in the presence

---

[1] Other factors affecting motivations to impression manage are the likelihood of future interaction (Christie and Geiss 1970; Fontana 1971), public v. private settings (Bradley 1978; House 1980; Simpson and Willer 2008), and the actor's dependency on the impression target (Jones et al, 1965; Hendricks and Brickman 1974; Bohra and Pandey 1984). However, because I *only* manipulate the value of the impression target, and hold all other motivations constant, I address only the former in detail.

4

of high status others (Schlenker 1980). This is because high status others are more likely to satisfy the three primary goals of impression management (cost-benefit ratio maximization, self-esteem enhancement, identity construction).

Specifically, those who are high in status are more likely to positively affect one's cost-benefit ratio because they tend to have greater access to valued social and material rewards (Leary and Kowalski 1990). Making a good impression in the presence of a high status other may therefore lead to increased social or material rewards. Because people tend to place greater value on the opinions and judgments of those high in status, these actors also tend to have a greater effect on one's self-esteem (Schlenkler 1975; 1980; Berger et al, 1972; 1977; 1985; Foschi 1992; 1996). As a result, high status targets can more easily elevate self-esteem through praise and approval and reduce it through critique and sanction. Finally, those high in status can more easily facilitate meaningful social identification by virtue of their social and material resources (Goffman 1959; Rosenberg 1979; Leary and Kowalski 1990). This is because, on average, high status actors have a greater ability to persuade the opinions of others and often have greater access to fora where persuasion is possible (Leary and Kowalski 1990).

Impression Management Tactics

Impression management research has identified a number of behaviors through which low status actors attempt to control high status others' perceptions of them, including ingratiation (Pandey 1981; 1986), stated attitudinal change (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959; Tedeschi et al, 1971), and apologetic behaviors (Schlenker 1975). That generosity within systems of reputation management can positively affect others' impressions has been verified in studies of indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Panchanathan

5

and Boyd 2004), group contributions (Willer 2008) and hunter-gatherer societies (Chagnon 1988).

Summing up, impression management theory suggests that the presence of a higher status other will positively impact dictator generosity

H1: When observed by a relatively high status other, a dictator will be more generous to a receiver than when observed by a relatively low status other.

However, as shown in the section to follow, competitive altruism research suggests that relative status has a different impact on generosity.

CHAPTER III

COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM THEORY

Hardy and Van Vugt (2006) argue that relative status interacts with reputational concerns to increase giving behavior. Reviewing anthropological field work, Van Vugt concludes that high status leaders in egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies are more generous than their lower status counterparts. Van Vugt argues that high status triggers, consciously or unconsciously, concerns for long-term gains in the form of status enhancement, whereas low status triggers concerns for short term gain in the form of material acquisition. Results from a series of laboratory experiments support Van Vugt's status→ generosity hypothesis and suggests that 1) high status actors may try to "out give" one another (hence *competitive altruism*), 2) that status acts as a heuristic trigger affecting reputational concerns, and 3) that those in high status positions may view their positions as one's of social responsibility.

Thus, competitive altruism theory suggests that the presence of a higher status other will negatively impact dictator generosity. Specifically:

H2: When observed by a relatively high status other, a dictator will be less generous to a receiver than when observed by a relatively low status other.

Thus, impression management theory, and competitive altruism theory suggest competing predictions for how relative status will interact with reputational systems to affect generosity between dictator and receiver. I argue that these competing explanations

can be reconciled via a *person x situation* interaction account. Specifically, I assert that individual differences in social values moderate the interaction of relative status and reputation, and ultimately affect generosity. Below I review the literature on social values, and how social values can moderate the effect of structural factors on individual behavior.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL VALUES

Social value orientations (SVO) refer to preferences for how outcomes are distributed between oneself and others in interdependent situations (McClintock and Liebrand 1988). Van Lange et al. (1997) note that social value orientations are relatively stable across life spans, but can be altered by life course events. According to SVO researchers, "different individuals assign different weights to their own and to others' outcomes. These weights…define an actor's social value orientation" (McClintock and Liebrand 1988:397). Many social value orientations are theoretically possible, but researchers focus primarily on three types of value orientations: "prosocials" prefer to maximize joint outcomes to themselves and others; "individualists" prefer to maximize their own outcomes regardless of others' outcomes (this is the typical type of person assumed in rational egoist accounts of behavior); and "competitors" prefer to maximize their relative outcome over others (Kollock 1998). Further analysis typically groups individualists and competitors into one classification known as "proselfs."

Considerable research has shown that prosocials view social situations in a different way than proselfs. For example, the "might over morality hypothesis" (Sattler and Kerr 1991) suggests that prosocials view interdependent situations as moral dilemmas, where cooperation is seen as a moral obligation, and non-cooperation is immoral. For proselfs, interdependent situations are about power, where defection is

9

viewed as powerful, and cooperation as weak. Findings support the might over morality hypothesis (Joireman et al, 2003). I argue that this line of research suggests that prosocials and proselfs may want to establish different types of reputations, such that prosocials are concerned with establishing "moral" reputations, whereas proselfs are concerned with establishing "powerful" reputations. While the aforementioned social values research indicates that prosocials and proselfs seek to establish different reputations, the research does not *fully* inform the question of my thesis: how does concern for reputation *interact with relative status*? To better understand how social values interact with status hierarchies, I briefly review work by Chen and et al. (2001).

Research by Chen and colleagues (2001) shows that individual differences conceptually similar to social values moderate the impact of stratification systems on behavior. The concepts are conceptually similar due to a prevalence of shared terms. Much like prosocials, communal oriented individuals are concerned with responding to the interests of those in need. Similar to proselfs, exchange oriented individuals are unconcerned with others' needs and interests, instead focusing on net benefits to self (Chen et al, 2001). Chen et al. hypothesized that *power* priming would have different effects on the behaviors of "exchange" oriented versus "communal" oriented persons. In order to prime participants with "power," Chen et al. had participants sit in a professor's chair, behind a professor's desk. Chen and colleagues reasoned that sitting in the professor's chair would serve as a subtle environmental prime or cue, activating concepts of power (amongst undergraduates).

Chen et al. found that exchange-oriented people became *less* generous toward a dependent other when primed with power. That exchangers are "corrupted" by power is

10

consistent with the arguments of most scholars (Hobbes 1651; Kipnis 1972; Georgesen and Harris 1998). However, when communal-oriented people were primed with power, they became *more* generous.

Taken together, the two different lines of research inform how concerns for reputation management will interact with relative status. Based on research on social values and social dilemmas, I argue that prosocials and proselfs seek to establish different reputations: prosocials as moral and generous, proselfs as powerful and less generous. The research by Chen and colleagues suggests that elevated status will cause actors to pursue their "natural" tendencies within a social dilemma. Based on the forgoing, I assert that social values moderate the interaction of status structures and reputational concerns on generosity. Specifically:

H3a: When observed by a relatively high status other, a prosocial dictator will be less generous to a receiver than when observed by a relatively low status other.

H3b: When observed by a relatively high status other, a proself dictator will be more generous to a receiver than when observed by a relatively low status other.

Because prosocials, on average, behave more altruistically than do proselfs, I also expect a main effect of social value orientation, such that prosocials will act more altruistically across all experimental conditions (see, for example, Simpson and Willer 2008).

The goal of the current research is to address how status hierarchies interact with reputational systems to affect generosity, *not* what mechanism underlies the interaction. Several mechanisms are conceivable. For example, I later discuss how the observed behavior may result from goal-association which acts independent of reputational

11

concerns. In the discussion section, I review competing explanations for the observed behavior, and suggest future studies to more accurately identify the mechanism(s).

CHAPTER V

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Participants were recruited from introductory classrooms at the University of South Carolina. A total of 117 students participated. Participants were blocked on social value orientation. To measure social value orientation, I administered a standard inventory designed to classify each individual as a prosocial or proself (Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange 1999). I used a one-shot dictator game to present participants with opportunities to act generously toward a dependent other (my dependent measure). As discussed previously, I modified the standard dictator game to include an observer who could "see" the actions taken by the dictator. To test the hypotheses, I manipulated the status of the observer relative to the dictator while leaving dictator and receiver equal in status.

To manipulate relative status, I altered the ages and education levels of the ostensible receiver and observer. I then presented participants with an opportunity to monetarily assist a dependent other (via the dictator position). Prior to making their decision as dictator, participants were instructed that while they would never meet the receiver, they would meet the observer and work "face-to-face" on a non-monetary problem solving task. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three status conditions (high, low, equal).

Procedure

13

Participants were scheduled in groups of eight to ten. Upon entering the laboratory, participants were individually escorted to isolation rooms where they completed consent forms. If the participant had no additional questions, he or she was instructed to turn on the computer monitor and follow the computerized instructions.

Instructions

Participants were instructed to enter their initials, education level, and age into the computer. They were told that certain other participants in the study would be given this information. As explained below, I used this information to 1) create a system of reputation management, and 2) create the status structure. Subjects were then told that they were being randomly assigned to a group with two other laboratory participants. In reality, there were no other participants. Participants were told further that each person in the triad would be randomly assigned a position: sender (dictator), receiver, or observer. In reality, the participant was always the dictator.

Status Hierarchy and Manipulation

In order to create a status hierarchy within the participant's group, I manipulated the ages and education levels of the other ostensible group members. Depending on the condition, the participant was told that he/she was 1) equal in age/education to the observer, 2) higher in age/education than the observer, or 3) lower in age/education than the observer. My use of age and education to manipulate status is consistent with existing research (see, for example, Thye 2000). The participant was also told, regardless of condition, that he/she was equal in age/education to the receiver. The instructions then explained how the dictator game worked and the responsibilities of each position. Lastly, the participants were informed that after making their decision as dictator, they would meet the observer

14

in a face-to-face non-monetary problem solving task but would not meet the receiver. This created an incentive for reputation management. The participant then answered a series of comprehension check questions to ensure that he/she understood the rules of the experiment and the dictator game. If the participant successfully answered the comprehension check questions, he/she moved onto the dictator game.

Dictator Game

The participant (dictator) was given an endowment of $8 and told that he or she could allocate any amount of it (from $0 to $8) to the receiver. After making the allocation decision, the participant answered some additional questions. Specifically, I asked the participants to complete a social values orientation inventory. The social values orientation inventory occurred only *after* the participant was asked basic demographic questions such as gender and ethnicity.

Social Values Orientation Inventory

Participants were instructed to complete a "triple dominance" measure of social value orientation (Van Lange 1999). Research on social values has shown that these preferences are temporally stable (Van Lange et al, 1997), and predict a wide range of prosocial and cooperative behaviors. Specifically, social values predict behavior both in experimental settings (e.g., economic games) and everyday settings (e.g., commuting choices and willingness to sacrifice in relationships) (Van Lange 1997; Liebrand et al, 1986). The measure of social value orientation presents participants with a series of nine decomposed games—each question consisting of three different point distributions for self and other. Within each of the nine questions, participants can choose one of the three point distribution scenarios. The resulting classifications are *prosocial* (maximizes total

15

payoff to self and other), *competitor* (maximizes difference between payoff to self and other), and *egoist* (maximizes payoff to self). Further re-composition classifies competitors and egoists as "proselfs". Following prior work (Simpson and Willer 2008), we classified participants only if they answered at least six of the nine scenarios in a manner consistent with one of the value orientations (prosocial, competitor, egoist).

After completing the social values orientations measures, participants were paid (between zero and eight US dollars) and thoroughly debriefed. During the debriefing session, I checked for suspicion. Five participants expressed doubt regarding the existence of the ostensible others and were excluded from data analysis. Further, I excluded an additional nineteen participants due to unclassifiable social value orientation inventory scores. The entire procedure took roughly forty minutes.

16

CHAPTER VI

RESULTS

Ninety three participants were included in data analysis (47 proselfs and 46 prosocials). Of the 47 proselfs, 22 were female. Out of 46 prosocials, 22 were female. Participants ranged from 18 to 27 years of age (with an average of 19.27).

I conducted an ANOVA to test the two main effect hypotheses, and the interaction prediction. (Neither gender ($p = .11$) nor race ($p = .47$) had a significant effect on dictator behavior. As such, the analyses to follow collapse across these two demographic variables.

Controlling for social value orientations, the status manipulation had no significant effect on dictator generosity. Results do not support main effect hypotheses 1 (impression management) or 2 (competitive altruism) as high/low status alone has no significant effect on giving [$F (1, 67) = 1.283$, $p = .262$].Consistent with prior work (Simpson and Willer 2008, Van Lange et al, 1997), results show a main effect of social values on generosity across *all* conditions [$F (1, 93) = 20.873$, $p < .001$]. However, the main effect of social values is qualified by a significant interaction between social values and the status manipulation [$F (1, 67) = 4.965$, $p < .05$]. Figure 1, below, shows the interaction between social values and status.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

17

Of the two interaction hypotheses (3a, 3b), only 3a is supported. High status prosocials give significantly more (M = 4.5) than low status prosocials (M = 3.39; t = 2.64; p < .05). Proselfs do not differ significantly in levels of giving between low (M = 2.62) and high status conditions (M = 2.26; t = .705; p = .486.), although results are in the predicted direction.

Because the significant interaction between social values and relative status may result from the participant being high status, low status, or both, I conducted an additional control condition where all positions (dictator, receiver, and observer) are equal in status. Results from the control condition were collapsed across gender and race, and analyses reveal that the significant interaction between social values and relative status results from both high and low status manipulations. Within the equal status condition, prosocial dictators give an average of $4.13, and proself dictators $2.44. This difference is significant (t = 2.8; p < .05). There is no significant difference in prosocial giving behavior between low status and control conditions (p = .1), or high status and control conditions (p = .17). Similarly, there is no significant difference in proself giving behavior between low status and control conditions (p = .23), or high status and control conditions (p = .24).

18

CHAPTER VII

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Generosity is affected by an interaction between social value orientations and relative status within reputation management systems. Prosocial dictators are significantly more generous when high status. Proself dictators respond in an opposite manner, but the response is not statistically significant. Because proself dictator behavior trends in the predicted direction, a more powerful, salient status manipulation might have generated statistically significant differences. Below, I briefly discuss a follow up study conducted in an attempt isolate the mechanism underlying the observed behaviors.

19

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL VALUES, STATUS, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

One possible explanation of the findings reported above falls out of work by De Cremer and Van Lange (2001). They found that, compared to proselfs, prosocials possess a greater sense of social responsibility. Social responsibility is defined as acting in socially endorsed ways, and in accordance with social norms (De Cremer et al, 2001). Encouraged by De Cremer and colleague's findings on social values and social responsibility, I hypothesized that prosocials and proselfs may incorporate beliefs on status into their conceptions of social responsibility. Specifically, I predicted that prosocials view elevated status as a basis of responsibility, and the enhanced sense of social responsibility that results from status leads to greater generosity, or fairness. Conversely, I predicted that proselfs perceive status as a privileged advantage, such that a negative association exists between status and social responsibility.

I administered a "status as social responsibility" inventory to 52 undergraduate students (34 females, 18 males). The inventory included 9 likert scaled questions such as "High status people have a responsibility to look out for lower status others." The inventory had relatively high reliability (alpha = .772). However, results did not support my social value x status as social responsibility hypothesis (p = .283). Prosocials and proselfs show no statistically significant difference in beliefs regarding status as a social

20

responsibility. In the sections to follow, I discuss additional mechanisms that may underlie the observed behaviors.

21

CHAPTER IX

ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON OBSERVED BEHAVIORS

Goal Association and Priming

If prosocials and proselfs do not differ in their beliefs about status and social responsibility, how else might we account for the results? Recall that prosocials and proselfs view social dilemmas in largely different ways. For prosocials, situations of interdependence are moral dilemmas, with cooperative and helpful behavior being the moral action. For proselfs, social dilemmas are about might and dominance, with non-cooperation behavior being the powerful action. Elevated status may have interacted with these differing beliefs, such that high status prosocials placed an increased emphasis on moral action, whereas high status proselfs placed a (nonsignficantly) increased emphasis on self-gain and dominance. The theory of goal association, discussed below, more fully elaborates this line of reasoning.

Goal association is a psychological concept that addresses how environmental cues interact with cognitive constructs within human memory systems (Bargh 1990). The perspective argues that human beings possess a large variety of goal-associations, and these goal associations can be activated by a wide variety of environmental stimuli. Once activated, goal association constructs guide the actor (often unconsciously) towards the goal associated behavior. A very common method of activating goal-association constructs is to empower the individual (for instance, via subtle psychological primes). In

22

my experiment, the experience of elevated status within the dictator game may have made salient goal constructs associated with social dilemmas. That those with different social value preferences can be systematically affected by subtle primes has been demonstrated by Smeesters and colleagues (2003). For prosocials, a salient goal within social dilemmas is cooperation, and fairness. For proselfs, the salient goal is to maximize net benefits received to self. Status may have acted as a prime, and regardless of the system of reputation management, guided the social actors toward acting more (prosocials) or less (proselfs) generously.

Social Teaching: Status as a Soap Box

Recall also that the status hierarchy is embedded in a system of reputation management. High status prosocial and proself dictators may have attempted to demonstrate to the ostensible others the "correct" action, seeing elevated status as sources of increased credibility and legitimacy. That high status others are viewed as more competent, trust worthy and legitimate falls directly out of research on status characteristics, performance expectations states, and reward expectation states (Thye 2000, Berger et al, 1985). Most importantly, the aforementioned theories argue that status is consensual—that all actors possess similar feelings and sentiments towards different status levels. From this perspective, high status actors had beliefs about others' beliefs regarding what responsibilities are associated with elevated status. Because proselfs and prosocials each believe their own typical course of action within social dilemmas is the "right" action (see, for example, Liebrand et al, 1986) the actors sought to teach others the correct behavior. Thus, high status proself dictators acted less generously, as they believed this was the "correct" action to teach or show others. Conversely, prosocial high status

23

dictators acted more generously, as they believed the "correct" action was to demonstrate

moral and egalitarian behavior.

CHAPTER X

LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

This study has several limitations, most notably that it does not identify the mechanism(s) underpinning the observed behaviors. I am confidently able to reject arguments based on "status as social responsibility," but as discussed in the previous section, a number of alternative explanations remain. Below, I briefly discuss future studies designed to investigate these alternative explanations, and better isolate the mechanism(s) underlying the observed behaviors.

To rule out explanations concerning the "teaching" of correct social dilemma actions, the reputation system would be removed (no mention of future interaction, no use of initials). If the observed behaviors persisted, future inquiries would focus on the effects of elevated status (e.g., goal associations).

To test the goal-association and status argument, I would prime prosocial and proself participants with high status concepts, and measure levels of giving in an unmodified dictator game (e.g., no status or reputation manipulation). If results mirror those of the present study, then it is probable that elevated status within the dictator game activates goal associations relevant to social dilemmas. I would conclude that the present findings likely result from experiences of elevated status independent of reputational systems.

25

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

Study limitations prevent me from isolating the exact mechanism(s) generating the observed behaviors. However, I show that within systems of reputation management and status hierarchies, prosocial actors significantly increase giving behavior when high status, whereas proselfs decrease (non-significantly) giving behavior when high status.

Structure theorists often conceive a singular actor who is either modeled on Homo economicus, or simply undefined in terms of motivation and utility (see, for example, Willer 1999). Here I explicitly define two different social actors, one of whom differs sharply from the standard rational actor used by structure theorists, and show that prosocials and proselfs understand and react to social structure in distinct ways. More generally, my findings form an initial bridge between previously disparate areas of research: social value orientations, status hierarchies, and systems of reputation management.

26

REFERENCES

Adler, A. 1930. Individual Psychology. In C. Murchinson (Ed.), *Psychologies of 1930*
(pp. 395-405). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.

Allport, G. 1955. *Becoming.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bales, R. F. 1950. *Interaction Process Analysis*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Bales, R. F., and F.L.Strodtbeck, 1951. "Phases in Group Problem-Solving." *Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46,* 485-495.

Bargh, J. A. 1990. "Auto-Motives: Preconscious Determinants of Social Interaction." In
E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino, *Handbook of
Motivation and Cognition, 93*-130. New York: Guilford Press.

Barkow, J. H. 1975. "Prestige and Culture: A Biosocial Interpretation." *Current
Anthropology, 16,* 553-572.

Berger, Joseph, Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1972. "Status Characteristics
and Social Interaction." *American Sociological Review*. 37:241- 55.

Berger, Joseph, M. Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and David G. Wagner. 1985.
"Formation of Reward Expectations in Status Situations." Pp. 215-261 in *Status
Rewards and Influence*, edited by Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, Jr. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Berger, Joseph, M.Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1977.

27

Bohra, K. A., and J. Pandey. 1984. "Ingratiation Toward Strangers, Friends, and Bosses."
*Journal of Social Psychology, 22,*117-222.

Bradley, G. W. 1978. "Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution Process: A Reexamination
of the Fact or Fiction Question." *Journal of Personality*
and Social Psychology, 36, 56-71.

Chagnon, Napoleon. 1988. "Life Histories, Blood Revenge, and Warfare in a Tribal
Population." *Science.* 239:985-992.

Chen, Serena, Lee-Chai, Annette Y. and John A. Bargh. "Relationship Orientation as a
Moderator of the Effects of Social Power." *Attitudes and Social Cognition*, 80,
2001.

Christie, R., and F.L. Geiss. 1970. *Studies in Machiavellianism.* New York: Academic
Press.

De Cremer, David and Paul A.M. Van Lange. 2001. "Why Prosocials Exhibit Greater
Cooperation Than Proselfs: The Roles of Social Responsibility and Reciprocity."
European Journal of Personality, 15, 5-18.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. 1989. *Human Ethology.* New York: Aldine De Gruyter. Fehr, Ernest
and Urs Fischbacher. 2004. "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms." *Human
Behavior and Evolution*, 25, 63-87.

Festinger, L., *and J.M. Carlsmith*. 1959. "Cognitive Consequences of Forced
Compliance." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58,*
203-210.

Fontana, A. F. 1971. "Machiavellianism and Manipulation in the Mental Patient Role."
Journal of Personality, 39, 252-263.

28

Foschi, Martha. 1992. "Gender and Double Standards for Competence." Pp. 181-207.
Gender, Interaction, and Inequality, edited by Cecilia L. Ridgeway. New York:
Springer-Verlag.

Foschi, Martha. 1996. "Double Standards in the Evaluation of Men and Women." *Social Psychology Quarterly*. 59:237-254.

Georgesen, J. C, and M. J., Harris, 1998. "Why's My Boss Always Holding Me Down? A
Meta-Analysis of Power Effects on Performance Evaluations."
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 184-195.

Goffman, E. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* Garden City, NY:
Doubleday Anchor.

Hardy, Charlie L., and Mark Van Vugt. 2006. "Nice Guys Finish First: The Competitive
Altruism Hypothesis." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32: 10, 1402-
1413

Hendricks, M., and P. Brickham. 1974. "Effects of Status and Knowledgeability of
Audience on Self-Presentation." *Sociometry, 37,* 440-449.

Hobbes. T. Leviathon. ([1651] 1968). Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.

House, W. C. 1980. "Effects of Knowledge That Attributions Will be Observed by
Others." *Journal of Research in Personality, 14,* 528-545.

Joireman, J. A., Kuhlman, D. M., Van Lange, P. A. M., Doi, T., and G. P Shelley. 2003.
"Perceived Rationality, Morality, and Power of Social Choice as a Function of
Interdependence Structure and Social Value Orientation." *European Journal of
Social Psychology*, 33, 413–437.

29

Jones, E. E., Gergen, K. J., Gumpert, P., and Thibaut, J. W. 1965. "Some Conditions
Affecting the Use of Ingratiation to Influence Performance
*Evaluation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1,*613-625.

Jones, E. E., and C. Wortman, 1972. *Ingratiation: An Attributional Approach*
Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

Keltner, D., Young, R. C, Heerey, E. A., Oemig, C, and N.D. Monarch. 1998. "Teasing
in Hierarchical and Intimate Relations." *Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 75,* 1231-1247.

Kipnis, D. 1972. "Does Power Corrupt?" *Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology,
24,* 33-41.

Kollock, P. 1998. "Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation." *Annual Review of
Sociology*, 24,183–214.

Leary, Mark R., and Robin M. Kowalski. 1990. "Impression Management: A Literature
Review and Two Component Model." *Psychological Bulletin*, 1, 34-37.

Liebrand, W. B. G., Jansen, R. W. T. L., Rijken, V. M., and C. J. M. Suhre, 1986. "Might
Over Morality: Social Values and the Perception of Other Players in Experimental
Games." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 22, 203–215.

McClintock, C. G., and W. B. G Liebrand. 1988. "Role of Interdependence Structure,
Individual Value Orientation, and Another's Strategy in Social Decision-Making:
A Transformational Analysis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55,
396–409.

Nowak, Martin A. and Karl Sigmund. 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image
Scoring." *Nature*, 393, 573-574.

Panchanathan, Karthik and Robert Boyd. 2004. "Indirect Reciprocity Can Stabilize Cooperation Without the Second Order Free Rider Problem." *Nature*, 432, 499-500.

Pandey, J. 1981. "A Note on Social Power Through Ingratiation Among Workers." *Journal of Occupational Psychology, 54,* 65-67.

Pandey, J. 1986. "Sociocultural Perspectives on Ingratiation." In B. Maher (Ed.), *Progress in experimental personality research* (Vol. 14, pp. 205-229). New York: Academic Press.

Rogers, C. R. 1959. "A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal. Relationships, as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework." In S. Koch (Ed.), *Psychology: A study of a science* (Vol. 3, pp. 184-256). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Rosenberg, M. J. 1979. *Conceiving the Self.* New York: Basic Books.

Sattler, D. N., & Kerr, N. L. 1991. "Might Versus Morality Explored: Motivational and Cognitive Bases for Social Motives." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60, 756–765.

Schlenker, B. R. 1975. "Self-Presentation: Managing the Impression of Consistency When Reality Interferes with Self-Enhancement." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32,* 1030-1037.

Schlenker, B. R. 1980. *Impression Management: The Self-Concept, Social Identity, and Interpersonal Relations.* Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Simpson, Brent and Robb Willer. 2008. "Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Interaction of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior." *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 71, 1, 37-52.

31

Smeesters, Dirk, Luk Warlop, Eddy Van Avermaet, Olivier Corneille, and Vincent Yzerbyt. 2003. "Do Not Prime Hawks With Doves: The Interplay of Construct Activation and Consistency of Social Value Orientation on Cooperative Behavior." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 972-987.

Smith, Eric Alden, Bird, Rebecca Bliege, and Douglas W. Bird. 2003. "The Benefits of Costly Signaling: Meriam Turtle Hunters." *Behavioral Ecology*, 14, 116-126.

Tedeschi, J. T., Schlenker, B. R., and T.V. Bonoma, 1971. "Cognitive Dissonance: Private Ratiocination or Public Spectacle?" *American Psychologist, 26,* 685-695.

Thye, Shane R. 2000. "A Status Value Theory of Power in Exchange Relations." *American Sociological Association*, 65, 407-432.

Van Lange, P. A. M. 1997. "Movement in Social Orientations: A Commentary on Kelley." *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 27, 423–432.

Van Lange, P. A. M. 1999. "The Pursuit of Joint Outcomes and Equality in Outcomes: An Integrative Model of Social Value Orientation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77, 337–349.

Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. N., & Joireman, J. A. 1997. "Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73, 733-746

Willer, David. 1999. *Network Exchange Theory*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Willer, Robb. 2008 "Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem." Forthcoming. *American Sociological Review*.

Zink, CF, Tong Y, Chen Q, Basset DS, Steign JL, and A. Meyer-Lindenberg. (2008).

"Know Your Place: Neural Processing of Social Hierarchy in Humans." *Neuron*, 24:58, 273-283.

Figure 1:

SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION X DICTATOR RELATIVE STATUS
INTERACTION ON ALTRUSITIC BEHAVIOR